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Abstract
Previous studies on the measurement of learning-by-doing emphasize the importance of ac-
counting for multi-vintage effects having an impact on firms’ production costs through economies
of scope. This study shows that accounting for cannibalization effects on the demand side is
equally important for the adequate measurement of learning. Since multi-vintage firms anticipate
the demand-side cannibalization effects in their production optimization, a previously omitted in-
centive to decrease production is captured having an impact on the measurement of learning by
doing. We derive an empirical model from a dynamic oligopoly game of learning-by-doing and
allow cannibalization effects to enter from the demand side. Using quarterly firm-level data for
the dynamic random access memory semiconductor industry, we find support for cannibalization
effects entering firms’ pricing relations resulting in higher estimated learning effects.
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importance of accounting for multi-vintage eﬀects having an impact on firms’
production costs through economies of scope. This study shows that account-
ing for cannibalization eﬀects on the demand side is equally important for the
adequate measurement of learning. Since multi-vintage firms anticipate the
demand-side cannibalization eﬀects in their production optimization, a previ-
ously omitted incentive to decrease production is captured having an impact
on the measurement of learning by doing. We derive an empirical model from
a dynamic oligopoly game of learning-by-doing and allow cannibalization ef-
fects to enter from the demand side. Using quarterly firm-level data for the
dynamic random access memory semiconductor industry, we find support for
cannibalization eﬀects entering firms’ pricing relations resulting in higher es-
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1 Introduction
An important aspect to consider in designing subsidy programs and promoting en-
try and industry growth is learning-by-doing .1 Learning-by-doing may have crucial
consequences on market structure and is important for firms to consider when de-
termining their optimal production rates. It improves operations either through
reduced time, lower labor costs, or reduced material waste (see e.g., Dick, 1991;
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983; Lieberman, 1982 and 1984; Majd and Pindyck, 1989;
Spence, 1981; and Wright, 1936).
This study stresses the importance of controling for cannibalization eﬀects on
the demand side when estimating learning-by-doing eﬀects. We are not aware of
any empirical study that focuses on the relationship between learning-by-doing and
cannibalization. With respect to learning-by-doing and cannibalization, output de-
cisions by multi-vintage firms are characterized by the following two opposing eﬀects:
(i) raising a vintage’s output achieves higher cost reductions in the future through
learning, which induces firms to increase their output, and (ii) raising a vintage’s
output further cannibalizes the demand of other vintages (in case they are imperfect
substitutes).2 Hence, firms anticipate the cannibalization eﬀects in their production
optimization. The inclusion of the second eﬀect (ii) attributes a higher production
rate to the achievement of future cost reductions through learning which results in
higher estimated learning-by-doing eﬀects.
Workers and managers learn from their past experiences and improve their op-
erations such that firms become more eﬃcient. Firms account for the fact that
drastically expanding output at the early stage of the life cycle has the advantage
1Miravete (2003) investigates whether a government is able to protect a domestic monopoly
against foreign competition which faces learning-by-doing eﬀects. Export subsidies provided to the
Japanese steel industry in the 1950’s and 1960’s, caused remarkable growth in production (more
than 400% from 1953 to 1964, and exports increased by 20% per year), raising Japan to the largest
steel exporter.
2Cannibalization eﬀects on the demand also enter firms’ production plans as firms’ contem-
poraneous output decision of one vintage determines future prices and demand of other vintages
through substitution eﬀects.
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of moving down the cost curve quickly. The eﬀect of moving down the learning
curve quickly becomes even more important when production is interpreted as a
commitment device. A firm can exploit an advantage in greater production speed
or in a headstart of introducing a new vintage by moving down the learning curve
quickly and achieving a Stackelberg leader position instead of Nash, see Fudenberg
and Tirole (1986 and 1991). The leader tries to enforce its Stackelberg outcome by
accumulating enough production before the follower reaches its reaction curve.
Stokey (1988) stresses that learning-by-doing also contributes to growth if ex-
perience of one vintage reduces costs for consecutive vintages. Recent empirical
studies account for learning across vintages or dynamic economies of scope, see e.g.,
Cohen and Levinthal (1989 and 1990), Irwin and Klenow (1994), Benkard (2000)
and Thornton and Thompson (2001). Gruber (1992) considers learning eﬀects in
a sequence of product innovations. He shows that learning eﬀects may result in a
persistence of leadership with firms having stable market shares over a sequence of
diﬀerent vintages. For further information about how learning within and across
vintages aﬀect market structure and performance, see also Ghemawat (1985) and
Ghemawat and Spence (1985).
Similar to the relationships between vintages on the supply side through learning,
vintages might also be related on the demand side through substitution eﬀects. If
products or vintages are (imperfect) substitutes, an increase in quantity of one vin-
tage will cannibalize the demand for other vintages. Hence, cannibalization occurs
when interrelations exist between vintages on the demand side, caused by substitu-
tion eﬀects (see also Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992).3 Cannibalization has
frequently been investigated in the literature. Prominent contributions are Moor-
thy and Png (1992), Mussa and Rosen (1978), Norton and Bass (1987) and Urban,
Johnson and Hauser (1984). Firms producing multiple vintages make their output
decisions at a centralized level such that they control for substitution and cannibal-
ization eﬀects within their own product line (see e.g., Berry, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn
3Product cannibalization has been defined as “the process by which a new product gains a
portion of its sales by diverting them from an existing product,” see Heskett (1976).
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and Pakes, 1995; Bresnahan, 1987; Goldberg, 1995; and Verboven, 1996). Aizcorbe
and Kortum (2005) and Song (2007) investigate the relationship between the intro-
duction of new vintages, cannibalization eﬀects and drastically declining prices in
the microprocessor market.
The diﬃculty in measuring learning eﬀects is that cost data are often not avail-
able. Most studies, therefore, attribute firms’ production incentives to the measure-
ment of learning eﬀects. For an adequate measurement of learning it is required
to encompass firms’ production incentives. Production incentives might be influ-
enced by interlinkages between products on the supply side (e.g., learning across
vintages), or by interlinkages between products on the demand side (e.g., cannibal-
ization caused by substitution eﬀects).
We specify a dynamic oligopolistic state-space game and estimate a dynamic
model consisting of demand and pricing equations. Using quarterly firm-level data
for the dynamic random access memory semiconductor industry, we find strong
support that cannibalization on the demand side has an impact on the measurement
of learning-by-doing rates. We provide evidence that accounting for a multi-vintage
firm specification results in learning-by-doing estimates of around 20%, which are
around 10% higher than in our benchmark case, which builds on a single-vintage
firm specification.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
characteristics of the semiconductor industry and introduces the data. In Section
3, we present the theoretical model of learning-by-doing with multi-vintage firms.
Section 4 describes the empirical model. We present the results in Section 5 and
conclude in Section 6.
2 The Semiconductor Industry
Several empirical studies focus especially on the innovation and learning aspects in
the semiconductor industry. For example, Hatch and Mowery (1998) examine the
relationship between process innovation and learning-by-doing. Hall and Ziedonis
3
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(2001) emphasize that the semiconductor industry is characterized by rapid techno-
logical change and cumulative innovation.4 Gruber (1992) also notes that learning
enters the manufacturing process through the fine-tuning of production processes.
For related work in this industry, see also Aizcorbe and Kortum (2005), Irwin and
Klenow (1994), Flamm (1993a and 1996), Gruber (1998), and Nye (1996), Song
(2007) and Zulehner (2003).
In capital-intensive industries, such as the semiconductor industry, learning mostly
occurs through improving manufacturing technologies and reducing material waste.5
The reduction of the required amount of silicon increases the yield rate which re-
duces firms’ costs.6 When firms engage in learning-by-doing their unit cost decline
over time, for production experience is accumulated through past output. Figure 1
illustrates that learning also brings an intertemporal dimension to a firm’s output
strategy, as current output yields cost savings in the future. Firms’ optimal strategy
is to further increase production, in order to invest in future cost reductions. Hence,
they set their output according to their dynamic marginal costs (MCD) which lie
below their static marginal costs (MCs).7 Firms may even obtain negative mark-ups
by pricing according to their dynamic marginal costs. The enormous decline of dif-
ferent vintage prices (see Figure 2) is often explained as a consequence of quantities
being set according to shadow marginal costs.
Another aspect of learning-by-doing is the “organizational forgetting” hypothe-
sis. There is a large body of literature focusing on organizational forgetting, the fact
4Jorgenson (2001) points out that the semiconductor market is an important industry, as the
enormous price decline has been transmitted to product prices that rely heavily on the semicon-
ductor market, i.e., the aircraft, automobiles, and scientific instruments industries. Jorgenson and
Vu (2005) emphasize the impact of investment in information technology on the world economic
growth.
5In contrast, for labor-intensive industries, such as the aircraft and shipbuilding industries,
learning is rather characterized by improving workers’ and managers’ operations, see e.g., Benkard
(2000), and Thornton and Thompson (2001).
6The yield rate measures the ratio of chips that pass the quality test, divided by the total
number of chips.
7Figure 1 is taken from Dick (1991).
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that experience may depreciate over time. Heiman, McWilliams, Shen, and Zilber-
man (2001), and Argote, Beckman, and Epple (1990) show that not accounting for
forgetting may overstate the persistence of learning-by-doing. Benkard (2000) shows
that in the aircraft industry, firms’ production experience depreciates heavily over
time. We do not explicitly account for organizational forgetting in our model, as
we are interested in highlighting the mismeasurement of learning due to neglecting
demand-side cannibalization eﬀects. Moreover, organizational forgetting is a crucial
aspect in labor-intensive industries, but not as important in capital-intensive indus-
tries, like the semiconductor industry. Note that the learning rate in our analysis
represents a net learning rate, gross learning less forgetting.
In the following, we introduce the Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)
industry and highlight the extent to which this industry is characterized by multi-
vintage firms: DRAM vintages or chips are one type of semiconductor and is mainly
used for the storage of information in binary form and deployed as inputs for the com-
puter industry, consumer electronics, and communications equipment. The DRAM
market is characterized by firms from the United States, Japan, Korea and Eu-
rope, with a 18.1%, 48.5%, 2.1%, and 31.3% market share, respectively, in 1996
(Dataquest). DRAM chips diﬀer in their capacity to store binary information units.
For example, the 4K DRAM chip is capable of storing 4K binary information units.
The memory capacity of successive vintages typically increases by a factor of four.
DRAM vintages represent homogenous goods in themselves, but represent (verti-
cally) diﬀerentiated goods across vintages (see Flamm, 1996; Gruber, 1996; and
Irwin and Klenow, 1994).8
The sales of chips are very much characterized by a product life cycle: once a vin-
tage is launched, shipments increase enormously and begin to fall when a successive
vintage is introduced. The life cycles last for about five years and look very similar
to each other. At the industry level, the life cycles of diﬀerent vintages overlap each
other (see Figure 3). Figures 4a-c provide evidence that the same pattern also holds
at the firm level. They illustrate the evolution of shipments of diﬀerent vintages over
8For detailed information regarding the production process of DRAMs, see also Flamm (1996).
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time for the 3 top-selling firms in the 64K vintage: NEC, Texas Instruments and
Hitachi, respectively. The figures clearly illustrate that firms simultaneously pro-
duce adjacent vintages. Hence, the figures support the notion that cannibalization
eﬀects might have an impact on the prices of adjacent vintages through substitution
eﬀects. Table 1 shows that the number of firms for diﬀerent vintages varies from 12
to 23 firms and illustrates that the DRAM industry is characterized by an oligopolis-
tic market structure. The table also shows that multiple consecutive vintages are
oﬀered by most of the firms in the DRAM industry. For instance, the 256K DRAM
chip is sold by 23 firms, of which 16 firms produce both adjacent vintages, the 64K
as well as the 1MB DRAM chip. It is interesting to note that all 256K DRAM
producers oﬀer at least one further adjacent chip. Hence, the table confirms the fact
that the DRAM industry is characterized by multi-vintage firms.
Our database consists of two parts. The first part, provided by Dataquest, de-
scribes quarterly firm-level shipments and average industry prices for diﬀerent vin-
tages beginning in 1974 for the 4K vintage and ending in 1996 for the 1MB vintage.
The second part consists of the GDP in electronics and electronic products and
factor prices, i.e., wages, material and energy costs. The worldwide GDP (GDP ) is
supposed to capture the overall activity in electronics (see Flamm, 1996) and con-
trols for the downstream demand of electronics. The variable is constructed using
the accumulated production of the five leading countries selling electronic products:
USA, Japan, Germany, France, and the UK.9 The price of material (mat) is deter-
mined by the world market price of silicon and taken from the ‘Metal Bulletin.’ The
remaining two firm-level factor prices, labor (lab) and energy (e), vary considerably
from country to country, and the variation in factor prices needs to be captured.
We use the the proportion of plants that each firm operates in every country and
interact those with the corresponding factor prices in these countries, i.e. USA,
Japan, Germany, UK, Korea, and Taiwan. The labor costs for firm i, in period t,
9These five countries account for more than 90% of the worldwide production in electronics
among the OECD countries. Missing data in the time series of other countries prevents us from
including those countries.
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are collected for the semiconductor industry (ISIC 3825) and taken from the STAN
Database, OECD (1998). The energy prices for firm i, in period t, are taken from the
International Energy Agency/OECD (1998). Following Irwin and Klenow (1994) we
also adjusted all factor prices using the producer price index.
Summary statistics and definitions of the variables are shown in Table 2. Focus-
ing on the 256K chip, the average price throughout the life cycle is US-$ 13.82 with
a maximum of US-$ 196.13 and a minimum of US-$ 1.27. A firm sells approximately
2.6 million chips per quarter, achieving a market share of approximately 11%. 14
firms are present, on average, in the market, whereby the maximum number of firms
is 19. These numbers confirm that the industry is characterized by an oligopolistic
market structure.
3 The Model
In the following, we introduce the theoretical model, which represents the basis for
the empirical model specification. We discuss the consequences on the measurement
of learning-by-doing stemming from the inclusion of demand-side cannibalization
eﬀects.
We consider a game which is based on Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and we follow
the description by Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) and Vives (1999). An oligopolistic
dynamic state-space game is modelled. We consider n multi-vintage firms, indexed
by i = 1...n, oﬀering subsequent vintages k = 1...K, in t = 1...T discrete time
periods. We assume products to be homogenous within a vintage itself, but diﬀer-
entiated across vintages.
Learning-by-doing eﬀects are modelled as arguments, which enter the cost func-
tion. The industry-wide past production vector for vintage k in period t is repre-
sented by Xk,t ≡ (xi,k,t)ni=1, where xi,k,t ≡
t−1P
τ=1
qi,k,τ denotes firm i’s past production
for vintage k, and qi,k,τ represents production of vintage k in period τ . The state for
vintage (k) evolves according to Xk,t = Xk,t−1+Qk,t where Qk,t ≡ (qi,k,t)ni=1 denotes
the industry output vector and Xk,0 = 0 states the initial condition, indicating
7
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that there is no experience at the beginning of the life cycle.10 With state-space
games, past pay-oﬀ relevant choices that aﬀect current profits are aggregated into
a state-variable for each firm. Firms follow state-dependent (feedback or Markov)
strategies, and choose actions depending on the state variables. Hence, firms decide
on their future strategies at any point in time conditional on their past.
We account for learning from own past experience and other firms’ past experi-
ence originating from vintage (k) as well as the preceding vintage (k−1). Moreover,
firm i’s costs are dependent on the contemporaneous firm-level output of vintage
(k) and the firm-level factor prices Wt11
Ci (qi,k,t,Wt;xi,k,t,X−i,k,t;xi,k−1,t,X−i,k−1,t) .
The industry-wide past production for vintage (k), excluding own past production,
is denoted by X−i,k,t ≡ (xj,k,t)j 6=i. Note that we also introduce firm-specific costs,
indexed by the subscript i, allowing for heterogeneity between firms.
Each firm chooses quantities in order to maximize the discounted sum of profits
over the entire product life cycle while using its state-dependent rules. The as-
sumption that firms set quantities is in line with the previous literature and is also
a reasonable assumption considering that every vintage represents a homogenous
good in itself. Firm i’s objective function is given by
max
{qi,k,t}Kk=1>0
Πi =
TX
t=1
KX
k=1
δt−1 [P (qk,t; qk−1,t, qk+1,t) qi,k,t
−Ci (qi,k,t,Wt;xi,k,t,X−i,k,t;xi,k−1,t,X−i,k−1,t)] (1)
where δ is the discount rate and P (qk,t; qk−1,t, qk+1,t) is the inverse demand function
for industry-wide demands qν,t ≡
nP
j=1
qj,ν,t for ν = k − 1, k, k + 1. Note that beyond
10Accodingly, the state for vintage (k − 1) evolves according to Xk−1,t = Xk−1,t−1 +Qk−1,t.
11However, as mentioned above, we take into consideration that labor and energy varies between
countries, and therefore between firms.
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vintage k, adjacent vintages (k − 1 and k + 1) enter the inverse demand equation
causing cannibalization eﬀects.12 The fact that the price of vintage k might be
influenced by both adjacent vintages is supported by our data, as shown in Figures
3 and 4.
Next, we illustrate that substitution eﬀects enter the supply side in a multi-
vintage firm specification and may result in diﬀerent learning estimates compared
to a single-vintage specification. Firm i0s first-order conditions based on equation
(1) with respect to the quantity of vintage k, is given by13
Pk,t +
∂qk,t
∂qi,k,t
h
∂Pk−1,t
∂qk,t
qi,k−1,t +
∂Pk,t
∂qk,t
qi,k,t +
∂Pk+1,t
∂qk,t
qi,k+1,t
i
=
∂Ci,k,t
∂qi,k,t
+
TP
s=t+1
δs−t
n
∂Ci,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
+
∂Ci,k,s
∂X−i,k,s
∂X−i,k,s
∂qi,k,t
+
∂Ci,k+1,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
+
∂Ci,k+1,s
∂X−i,k,s
∂X−i,k,s
∂qi,k,t
−
Ã
nP
j 6=i
∂qj,k,s
∂Cj,k,s
∂Cj,k,s
∂xj,k,s
∂xj,k,s
∂qi,k,t
+
nP
j 6=i
∂qj,k+1,s
∂Cj,k+1,s
∂Cj,k+1,s
∂xj,k,s
∂xj,k,s
∂qi,k,t
!
×
³
∂Pk−1,s
∂qk,s
qi,k−1,s +
∂Pk,s
∂qk,s
qi,k,s +
∂Pk+1,s
∂qk,s
qi,k+1,s
´o
(2)
for t < s. The first line shows firm i’s marginal profits in a static environment
without learning eﬀects. It shows the direct eﬀect of firm i’s output choice on
its contemporaneous profits. The left-hand side of equation (2) represents firm i’s
marginal revenues and the expression
∂qk,t
∂qi,k,t
indicates the conjectural variation term
or the conduct parameter (see also Iwata, 1974; and Bresnahan, 1989). In comparing
this to the standard marginal revenue term when only one vintage is considered in
the market (single-vintage firm specification), beyond the own-price eﬀects (∂Pk,s∂qk,s ),
12Note that we tested for robustness and allowed two adjacent vintages to enter the inverse
demand equation, and two preceding vintages to enter firms’ cost functions. Estimation results
show that substitution eﬀects beyond adjacent vintages are not having a significant impact, i.e.,
learning is not significant across two vintages. The estimation results are available from the author
upon request.
13In order to better illustrate the interdependency between demand-side cannibalization across
vintages and the measurement of learning eﬀects, we focus on the firm’s maximization problem for
vintage k.
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further substitution eﬀects
³
∂Pk−1,t
∂qk,t
and
∂Pk+1,t
∂qk,t
´
enter the pricing relation. When
adjacent products are substitutes (complements), the eﬀects are supposed to be
negative (positive). The first line on the right-hand side of equation (2) represents
the common contemporaneous or static marginal costs and indicates how current
output aﬀects current costs through economies of scale.
The following three lines of equation (2) show the dynamic link between firms’
current output decisions and firms’ environment they find themselves in, in the
future, induced by learning. Firms account for intertemporal eﬀects having an
impact on their own and their rivals’ unit costs and on future prices through learning.
Note that we assume competitors in the future respond only to firms’ current output
choices in anticipation of cost advantages from industry-wide learning. Therefore, we
ignore other strategic reasons that do not enter the cost function, such as preemption
or dumping eﬀects.
The first two terms in the second line of equation (2) represent firms’ own learning
and learning from others within a vintage (k). They illustrate how firm i0s current
output of vintage k aﬀects its own future costs for vintage (k). The term ∂Ci,k,s∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
refers to the own learning eﬀect within vintage (k), indicating that own current
output of vintage k increases own experience and yields own cost savings in the
future. The term is supposed to be negative. The term
∂Ci,k,s
∂X−i,k,s
∂X−i,k,s
∂qi,k,t
represents
learning from other firms within a vintage (k). This expression shows that firm i’s
output decision in period t increases other firms’ experience in the future, having
an impact on its own costs for vintage k in the future. This eﬀect measures by how
much firm i’s costs decline through capturing part of the rivals’ experience.
The next two terms in the second line of equation (2) account for firms’ own
learning and learning from others across vintages. They illustrate how firm i0s
current output of vintage k aﬀects its own future costs for vintage (k + 1). The
specification corresponds to the two previous terms adjusted for cross-vintage eﬀects.
The two terms in the third line of equation (2), in combination with the fourth
line, indicate that firm i is also aware of how its output decision of vintage (k)
aﬀects future output as well as future prices of current and adjacent vintages. For
10
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example, the term
∂qj,k,s
∂Cj,k,s
∂Cj,k,s
∂xj,k,s
∂xj,k,s
∂qi,k,t
represents a strategic intertemporal term, which
indicates how firm i’s output of vintage k impacts the rivals’ future output of vintage
k through learning within a vintage. The next term represents the same strategic
intertemporal eﬀect across vintages. These strategic intertemporal eﬀects reflect the
fact that firms follow no memory closed-loop strategies, i.e., firms condition their
play at time t on the history of the game until that date (see also Basar and Olsder,
1991). This therefore allows firms to adjust their output paths throughout the life
cycle (opposed to precommitment or open-loop strategies). Consequently, the last
two terms in the second line of equation (2) indicate that competitors’ quantity
responses are anticipated in an intertemporal fashion via achieving cost reductions
through learning. The terms highlight the fact that firms follow feedback strategies
in which they consider the strategic eﬀect of their own output on their rivals’ future
output decision.14 Zulehner (2003) shows that the assumption that firms following
no memory closed-loop strategies is appropriate for the semiconductor industry.
The last line of equation (2) shows that future own price eﬀects and substitu-
tion eﬀects enter firm i’s pricing relation through the interaction with the strategic
intertemporal term. Comparing the first-order condition of a multi-vintage specifica-
tion with a single-vintage specification, shows that marginal revenues are determined
by a further component, i.e., the substitution eﬀects. Those are interacted with the
conjectural variation term and the intertemporal strategic terms. Hence, multi-
vintage firms are aware that increasing the production rate of vintage k will have a
current as well as an intertemporal impact on the prices and quantities demanded
for adjacent vintages.
In the presence of learning, the output decisions by multi-vintage firms are char-
acterized by the following trade-oﬀ: (i) raising a vintage’s output achieves higher
cost reductions in the future through learning, which induces firms to increase their
output, and (ii) increasing a vintage’s output cannibalizes the demand of other vin-
tages. In a multi-vintage specification, firms anticipate the cannibalization eﬀect in
their production optimization. Hence, in a single-vintage specification, a further in-
14For existence of a Nash equilibrium with feedback strategies, see Basar and Olsder (1991).
11
12
Submission to The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap
centive to decrease production to avoid cannibalization is ignored. Since cumulated
output is used as a proxy for experience and adopted to measure learning eﬀects,
the inclusion of demand-side cannibalization eﬀects results, ceteris paribus, in higher
learning eﬀects. The omission of the second eﬀect attributes a lower production rate
to the achievement of future cost reductions through learning. Our hypothesis which
will be tested empirically is stated as follows:
A multi-vintage firm specification will result in higher estimated learning
eﬀects than a single-vintage specification, if vintages represent (imper-
fect) substitutes.
In the next section, we test our hypothesis by estimating a dynamic model con-
sisting of demand and pricing relations, based on equation (2).
4 The Empirical Model
In order to test our hypothesis, we are interested in estimating a dynamic model
consisting of demand and pricing equations. Since the number of firms in the indus-
try is close to 20, the curse of dimensionality becomes a problem when solving for
Markov Perfect Equilibria, and computing firms’ value functions.15 Therefore, we
will estimate the eﬀects of interest from firms’ first-order conditions.16 Building on
the theoretical model from which we derived the supply relations for a multi-vintage
firm specification, we specify our empirical model.17 Specifically, our model consists
of three inverse demand functions from which we derive the corresponding own-price
and substitution eﬀects and firms’ pricing relations, which are based on equation
(2).
15See also Pakes and McGuire (1994 and 2001) and Ericson and Pakes (1995).
16As the main focus of the paper is to highlight the potential mismeasurement of learning eﬀects
when ignoring demand-side cannibalization eﬀects, the estimation from first-order conditions is an
appropriate method since empirical counterfactuals are not relevant here. Note, that the estimation
from first-order conditions does not require the computation of the firms’ value functions.
17Our model specification is also related to Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and Jarmin (1994).
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4.1 The Inverse Demand Functions
The inverse demand functions are given by18
Pk−1,t = a0 + a1 ∗ qk−2,t + a2 ∗ qk−1,t + a3 ∗ qk,t (3)
+a4 ∗GDPt + εk−1,t
Pk,t = b0 + b1 ∗ qk−1,t + b2 ∗ qk,t + b3 ∗ qk+1,t (4)
+b4 ∗GDPt + µk,t
Pk+1,t = c0 + c1 ∗ qk,t + c2 ∗ qk+1,t + c3 ∗ qk+2,t (5)
+c4 ∗GDPt + ωk+1,t.
For the sake of convenience, let us consider the inverse demand equation (4) only;
the same rationale applies to equations (3) and (5). As can be seen in equation (4),
the price Pk,t depends on the industry output of the vintage under consideration
(qk,t), as well as the industry output of the adjacent vintages qk−1,t and qk+1,t. The
worldwide GDP in electronics and electronic products (GDPt) is incorporated into
our model as a demand shifter. The coeﬃcient b2 indicates the own-price eﬀect.
The sign is expected to be negative, for a higher output results in lower prices.
The coeﬃcients b1 and b3 refer to the substitution eﬀects and are supposed to be
negative (positive) when adjacent products are substitutes (complements). From
the estimation of the inverse demand equations (3), (4), and (5), we obtain the
corresponding price eﬀects, given by the estimated coeﬃcients ca3, bb2, and bc1, which
are plugged into the pricing relation in the second stage.
4.2 The Pricing Relations
Solving the first-order equation (2) for price as a function of output and dynamic
marginal costs, gives us the following pricing relation, which will be estimated
18The specification of the inverse demand functions is in line with the study by Flamm (1996)
in which adjacent vintages enter the equations.
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Pk,t = α0,i + α1 lnXi,k,t + α2 lnX−i,k,t + α3 lnXi,k−1,t + α4 lnX−i,k−1,t + α5 ln qi,k,t
+α6 lnmatt + α7 ln labi,t + α8 ln ei,t + α9Dyn Effecti,k,t − α10PEi,k,t + νi,k,t.
(6)
As described above, firms’ dynamic marginal costs are composed of the static mar-
ginal costs, represented by the term
∂Ci,k,t
∂qi,k,t
in equation (2), and the dynamic eﬀects
which yield future cost reductions through learning, as shown in the second and the
consecutive lines of equation (2).
Firms’ static marginal costs are empirically specified by accounting for the follow-
ing aspects. We include firm specific eﬀects α¯0,i in order to capture any unobserved
heterogeneity in the cost function.19 We account for own learning-by-doing within
a vintage by incorporating the variable Xi,k,t which represents firm i’s experience
in production for vintage k. The variable is constructed by taking the accumulated
past production of firm i until period t − 1. We also account for learning eﬀects
within a vintage that firms gain from their rivals’ experience through spillovers,
measured by the variable X−i,k,t which is constructed by taking the accumulated
past production of vintage k of all firms until period t − 1. The variables Xi,k−1,t
and X−i,k−1,t are supposed to capture learning from own experience and other firms’
experience from vintage k− 1. The construction of those variables follows the same
rationale as for vintage k. The signs of coeﬃcients α1 to α4 are supposed to be
negative if the specific type of learning reduces marginal costs. We also control for
static economies of scale eﬀects measured by qi,k,t, i.e., firm i’s current output of
vintage k in period t. The scale eﬀect is negative, zero, or positive, when increasing,
constant, or decreasing returns are prevalent.20 We also use the following factor
prices: the price of material or silicon (matt), labor (labi,t) and energy (ei,t).
19Note that the coeﬃcient α0,i = α¯0,i + bα0,i in equation (6) controls for firm-specific eﬀects,
where α¯0,i stems from the static marginal cost function and bα0,i is supposed to capture remaining
unobserved heterogeneities.
20Considering both, learning and economies of scale eﬀects together, is necessary for both to
influence each other. The existence of economies of scale results in a contemporaneous unit cost
decline by increasing output. Ignorance of scale coincides with an inappropriate omission of the
current output variable which impacts the learning eﬀects. The cost reduction eﬀect is exclusively
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As learning also induces a dynamic aspect through which future cost reductions
are achieved we have to account for the fact that firms may price below their static
marginal costs in order to gain cost savings in the future. The problem is that
the dynamic part of the mark-up is complicated, and computing the value function
is diﬃcult due to the large number of firms. Alternatively, we could estimate the
dynamic eﬀect. The problem, however, is that the model would not be identified
if all terms that measure the dynamic eﬀects are estimated, as they vary over all 3
subindexes i, k, and t. Consequently, the dynamic eﬀects cannot be identified sep-
arately from the static mark-up. However, we must control for firms’ stages within
the life cycle, in order to account for the fact that firms optimize their intertemporal
production plans. We enable the estimation procedure and identify the dynamic
eﬀects by making a functional form assumption. We capture the firm-specific dy-
namic eﬀects by introducing a firm-specific time trend (Dyn Effecti,k,t). This trend
controls for number of remaining periods in the life cycle of vintage k. It captures
future potential cost savings at the firm-level depending on the period within the
life cycle.
Finally, the PE variable represents
h
∂Pk−1,t
∂qk,t
qi,k−1,t +
∂Pk,t
∂qk,t
qi,k,t +
∂Pk+1,t
∂qk,t
qi,k+1,t
i
from
the first line of equation (2), where the own-price eﬀect ∂Pk,t∂qk,t as well as the substi-
tution eﬀects ∂Pk−1,t∂qk,t and
∂Pk+1,t
∂qk,t
will be replaced with the estimated coeﬃcients bb2,
ca3, and bc1, respectively, from the inverse demand equation. We assume that firms
behave like Cournot players and set the conduct parameter equal to one. The esti-
mation procedure will be explained in Section 5.
5 Results
As the pricing relations will be estimated for the 256K DRAM vintage (k), we need to
estimate the inverse demand equations for the 256K DRAM vintage (k), as well as for
the 64K DRAM and 1MB DRAM vintages (k−1 and k+1, respectively). We assume
attributed to the learning curve, though part of it is in fact due to the presence of economies of
scale: an omitted variable bias will occur (see Berndt, 1991).
15
16
Submission to The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap
additive econometric disturbances which have a mean of zero and a covariance matrix
Φ. Since aggregate firms’ (or industry) outputs for the vintage under consideration
might be correlated with the error term, we need to use instruments in order to
identify the demand elasticity. We use factor prices as instruments, i.e., material
(silicon), wages and energy, that capture the shifts of marginal costs on the supply
side. Moreover, we capture changes in the degree of competitiveness in the product
market by accounting for summary statistics from the supply side, such as the
number of firms present in the market. We also use a time trend indicating the
length of time a vintage has been in the market.21 The inverse demand functions
(3), (4), and (5) are estimated using 2 stage least squares using the Newey and West
(1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix.
The estimation results for the inverse demand equations (3), (4), and (5) are
presented in Table 3. In the estimation procedures 68, 57, and 46 observations
have been used for vintages k − 1, k, and k + 1, respectively. All three estimations
have a remarkably good fit. The adjusted R-squares are 0.72 and higher, and all
own-price eﬀects are significant at the 1% level. The own-price eﬀects carry the
expected negative sign, indicating that a higher industry output decreases prices.
Calculating the corresponding own-price elasticities by using the estimated price
eﬀects evaluated at the sample means of prices and quantities, results in elasticities
of around -1, which is close to what previous studies found, see e.g., Flamm (1993b),
Irwin and Klenow (1994) and the literature cited therein, and Zulehner (2003).
The substitution eﬀects are significant at least at the 10% level, with c3 being
the only exception. The negative estimates show that adjacent vintages represent
substitutable products and indicate that cannibalization eﬀects are prevalent on the
demand side.
Turning to the multi-vintage firm pricing relation, we instrument for firms’ con-
temporaneously chosen outputs, as well as own learning and learning from other
firms within vintages. As instruments, we use the GDP as a demand shifter and
21The time trend could also be interpreted as a proxy for intertemporal price discrimination
among consumers.
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lagged endogenous variables as well as summary statistics that reflect the competi-
tiveness in the market, such as the number of firms and average market shares.22 We
impose the same restrictions on econometric disturbance terms as above and use the
same two-stage least squares procedure as for the inverse demand equations. The
estimates of the multi-vintage firm pricing relation are shown in Table 4, columns
2 and 3. We use 611 observations in our estimations, which have a very good fit.
The adjusted R-square is 0.58. Most of the parameter estimates are significant at
the 1% level. The coeﬃcient α1 measures the eﬀect of own learning within a vintage
(Xi,k,t) on marginal costs. As the results show, the estimate is highly significant
and negative. Evaluating the learning elasticity at the respective sample mean and
correcting for the semilog specification, amounts to a learning elasticity of −0.341,
which corresponds to a 20.9% learning rate. The learning rate is calculated by using
the formula 1− 2α, where α represents the learning elasticity. Hence, a doubling in
a firm’s accumulated output of vintage k (at the sample mean) reduces marginal
costs of the corresponding vintage by 20.9%. This estimate is similar to what the
engineering literature claims.
We also estimate a single-vintage specification as a benchmark case, which fol-
lows the same specification as the multi-vintage firm specification with the exception
that substitution eﬀects are set equal to zero, such that no cannibalization eﬀects
enter the pricing relation. The results are shown in Table 4, columns 4 and 5. The
adjusted R-square is 0.56. The single-vintage specification returns a learning rate
of 11.7%. This finding confirms our hypothesis that a multi-vintage firm specifica-
tion returns a higher learning-by-doing estimate than a single-vintage specification.
To summarize, a multi-vintage firm specification captures the trade-oﬀ between in-
creasing output in order to gain cost savings due to learning, and reducing output
in order to diminish cannibalization eﬀects on adjacent vintages. The latter eﬀect
is ignored by econometricians, resulting in too low of a production incentive that is
referred to learning-by-doing.
22For a more detailed discussion on regaining consistency when accumulated output is correlated
with the error term, see e.g., Olley and Pakes (1996).
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In order to test if the learning estimates between the single- and multi-vintage
specification are statistically diﬀerent from each other, it is useful to generate the
complete distribution of the estimators. In order to test for significance between the
learning estimates we use bootstrap methods. The advantage with bootstrapping is
that we do not need to know the type of distribution from which a sample has been
taken. We use a non-parametric bootstrap method (with replacement) as suggested
by Efron (1982) and generate 1,000 bootstrap samples of the same size as the original
dataset, which makes up to 611,000 observations in total and estimate the learning
estimates for each bootstrap sample.23 The bootstrap samples are used in order to
test whether the learning estimates are statistically diﬀerent from each other. Using
a test of H0 : bam4 = bas4 against Ha : bam4 6= bas4 and applying the percentile interval
method, we compare the estimated learning rates with the percentile value in the
sampled dataset.24 Our test statistic shows that we can reject H0 approximately at
the 10%.level.
Our results also confirm significant own learning eﬀects across vintages (Xi,k−1,t).
This finding indicates that a higher degree of past experience for vintage k−1 reduces
marginal costs for vintage k. Our estimation of the multi-vintage specification,
returns a learning rate of 12.7%. The single-vintage specification returns a very
similar learning rate of 12.2%. Interestingly, the learning eﬀects across vintages
are only about half as large as the learning eﬀects within vintages. The finding of
learning across vintages (or intergenerational spillovers) also supports the results by
Irwin and Klenow (1994). As mentioned above, we performed robustness checks with
regard to learning across vintages. Hence, we estimated specifications in which two
preceding vintages enter the cost function and (accordingly) two adjacent vintages
enter the inverse demand equation. The estimation results confirm that knowledge
fully depreciates after one generation. For example, the experience of producing the
64K chip contributes to the knowledge of producing the 256K chip, but it does not
23For tests at a 0.05 significance level , Efron (1993) and Davidson and MacKinnon (2000)
recommend 200 and 399 samples, respectively.
24Note that bam4 and bas4 represent the own-learning estimates within vintages for the multi- and
the single-vintage specification, respectively.
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benefit the production process of any successive vintage.
Learning from others is significant across vintages and amounts to 12.2%. The
learning rate from own experience is similar in magnitude to the learning rate from
other firms’ experience. We do not find significant learning eﬀects from others within
vintages. This result supports the fact that knowledge from competitors takes time
to be absorbed and to be implemented into current production processes. We also
applied diﬀerent robustness checks and get similar results.
The estimate for the economies of scale eﬀects (qi,k,t) is significant and positive,
indicating that decreasing static returns to scale are evident. The significant esti-
mate of the coeﬃcient α9, indicates that firms further increase quantities in order
to benefit from future cost reductions. The coeﬃcients for the factor prices (except
energy) are positive, which is meaningful since higher factor prices are supposed to
raise firms’ marginal costs.
6 Conclusion
This study demonstrates the importance of accounting for demand-side cannibal-
ization eﬀects and illustrates its impact on the measurement of learning-by-doing.
Once demand-side cannibalization eﬀects are accounted for, firms face a trade-oﬀ in
determining the optimal production rate. On the one hand an increase in production
will gain future cost savings through learning-by-doing. On the other hand, firms
anticipate a disincentive to increase production, as cannibalization eﬀects reduce
the demand for the other vintages. Accounting for demand-side cannibalization ef-
fects attributes a higher production incentive to the measurement of learning eﬀects,
resulting in higher estimated learning eﬀects.
Our results show that adjacent DRAM vintages represent (imperfect) substitutes.
We can confirm that learning-by-doing eﬀects are estimated higher in a multi-vintage
specification. The learning rates within vintages are estimated to be 20.9% opposed
to a learning rate of 11.7% in a single-vintage firm specification.
The adequate measurement of learning-by-doing eﬀects is relevant for evaluating
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industrial policies as well as understanding the evolution of market structure and
industry growth. Higher estimated learning eﬀects within vintages may have crucial
implications on firms’ optimal production plans. For example, being aware of a
higher learning eﬀect provides larger incentives to further increase contemporaneous
output in order to benefit from future cost reductions. Moreover, higher learning
eﬀects provide additional incentives for firms to introduce new products early in
order to gain a headstart in moving down the learning curve, and to gain cost
advantages to their competitors.25
The finding is also important from a policy’s point of view. Accounting for
cannibalization eﬀects on the demand side might be relevant for the decision whether
to provide subsidies to single- or multi-vintage firms. For example, if adjacent
vintages are close substitutes, we may expect the promotion of single-vintage firms
to be beneficial, as those do not face a disincentive to increase production in order
to avoid cannibalization eﬀects. On the other hand, promoting multi-vintage firms
might be beneficial if learning eﬀects across vintages are suﬃciently high such that
the benefits gained from learning across vintages compensates the negative eﬀects
arising from the disincentive to increase production in order to avoid cannibalization
eﬀects. It is worth mentioning that the adoption of new vintages in combination
with persistence of consumption might result in a similar price pattern as shown in
Figure 2. For future research it might be worth it to examine to what extent the
rapid price declines are due to the fact that firms drastically reduce prices in order
to make new products more attractive to consumers.
Our learning estimates across vintages are 12.7%. It is interesting to note that
the learning rate across vintages is only about half the size of the learning rates
within vintages. Moreover, the learning estimates from own experience are not
diﬀerent from the learning rates across firms. The finding of learning-by-doing across
vintages may provide incentives to continue keeping previous vintages in the market
in order to capture further learning eﬀects across vintages.
25Those aspects are beyond the scope of the paper and need to be elaborated in more detail in
future research.
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Appendix: Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Price setting with respect to shadow marginal costs. Source: Dick (1991).
Figure 2: Price decline per generation over time. Source: Dataquest (1996).
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Figure 3: Units of shipments (millions) per generation. Source: Dataquest (1996).
Figure 4a: NEC’s shipments (in millions). Source: Dataquest (1996).
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Figure 4b: Texas Instruments’s shipments. Source: Dataquest (1996).
Figure 4c: Hitachi’s shipments (in millions). Source: Dataquest (1996).
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Table 1: Production of generations in the DRAM industry, 1974-1996
Firms Gener. 4K 16K 64K 256K 1Mb 4Mb 16Mb 64Mb
Adv. Micro Dev. 3 x x x . . . . .
Alliance 1 . . . . . x . .
Am. Microsyst. 1 x . . . . . . .
AT&T 2 . . . x x . . .
Eurotechnique 1 . x . . . . . .
Fairchild 3 x x x . . . . .
Fujitsu 8 x x x x x x x x
G-Link 2 . . . . x x . .
Hitachi 8 x x x x x x x x
Hyundai 6 . . x x x x x x
IBM 4 . . . . x x x x
Inmos 2 . . x x . . . .
Intel 5 x x x x x . . .
Intersil 2 x x . . . . . .
LG Semicon 5 . . . x x x x x
Matsushita 6 . x x x x x x .
Micron 5 . . x x x x x .
Mitsubishi 7 . x x x x x x x
Mosel Vitelic 5 . . x x x x x .
Mostek 4 x x x x . . . .
Motorola 8 x x x x x x x x
Nan Ya Techn. 1 . . . . . . x .
Ntl. Semic. 4 x x x x . . . .
NEC 8 x x x x x x x x
Nippon 4 . . . x x x x .
OKI 5 . . x x x x x .
Ramtron Int. 1 . . . . . x . .
Samsung 6 . . x x x x x x
Sanyo 3 . . . x x x . .
SGS-Ates 2 x x . . . . . .
Sharp 4 . . x x x x . .
Siemens 7 . x x x x x x x
Signetics 2 x x . . . . . .
STC-ITT 3 x x x . . . . .
Texas Instr. 8 x x x x x x x x
Toshiba 7 . x x x x x x x
Vanguard 2 . . . . . x x .
Zilog 1 . x . . . . . .
Table 1 presents firms being active in markets for specific DRAM generations. The data are taken
from Dataquest and encompass the period 1974 to 1996.
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Table 2: Variable definitions and summary statistics
Variable Description Mean Min. Max.
P64K,t Average selling price of one chip 20.866 0.890 241.240
of generation 64K in period t.
P256K,t Average selling price of one chip 13.828 1.265 196.130
of generation 256K in period t.
P1Mb,t Average selling price of one chip 16.077 2.607 130.669
of generation 1Mb in period t.
q64K,t Total number of chips of the 64K 28.617 0 264.395
generation being sold in period t.
q256K,t Total number of chips of the 256K 50.925 0 242.412
generation being sold in period t.
q1Mb,t Total number of chips of the 1Mb 51.648 0 215.633
generation being sold in period t.
Xi,64K,t Past accumulated output for firm i oﬀering 64.115 0 2,632.794
generation 64K in period t.
Xi,256K,t Past accumulated output for firm i oﬀering 82.648 0 4,681.152
generation 256K in period t.
Xi,1Mb,t Past accumulated output for firm i oﬀering 47.662 0 4,694.359
generation 256K in period t.
qi,64K,t Firm i’s number of chips from the 1.383 0 264.395
64K generation being sold in period t.
qi,256K,t Firm i’s number of chips of the 2.612 0 242.412
256K generation being sold in period t.
qi,1Mb,t Firm i’s number of chips of the 1Mb 2.649 0 215.633
generation being sold in period t.
NOF64K,t Number of firms competing in the 10.191 0 20
market of generation 64K at period t.
NOF256K,t Number of firms competing in the 14.333 0 19
market of generation 256K at period t.
NOF1Mb,t Number of firms competing in the 15.435 0 19
market of generation 1Mb at period t.
AMS64K,t Average market share of firms in 0.165 0 1
generation 64K at period t.
AMS256K,t Average market share of firms in 0.111 0 1
generation 256K at period t.
AMS1Mb,t Average market share of firms in 0.099 0 1
generation 1Mb at period t.
Table 2 presents summary statistics using quarterly data from 1974 until 1996 provided by
Dataquest. All quantities are multiplied by 10−6 and prices are deflated using the consumer price
index.
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Table 3: Inverse demand equations
64K generation 256K generation 1Mb generation
Variable Estimate Std. err. Estimate Std. err. Estimate Std. err.
Constant 638.729** 43.6654 488.089** 40.747 314.070** 74.414
q16K -2.016** 0.219
q64K -0.521** 0.064 -0.543** 0.066
q256K -0.342** 0.049 -0.302** 0.032 -0.270** 0.054
q1Mb -0.079* 0.046 -0.152** 0.060
q4Mb -0.071 0.053
GDP -38.601** 2.802 -28.379** 2.617 -16.116** 5.653
Obs.=68, adj. R2=0.752 Obs.=57, adj. R2=0.745 Obs.=46, adj. R2=0.721
Table 3 presents two-stage least squares estimation results for the inverse demand equations
(3), (4), and (5). The dependent variable is industry price (deflated by the consumer price
index) for the vintage under consideration. Explanatory variables are the total industry output for
the corresponding vintage, industry output for the adjacent vintages and the GDP in electronics
(deflated by the consumer price index). All industry quantities and GDP are multiplied by
10−6. We instrument industry output of generation k using supply shifters, i.e., material, labor
and energy prices (factor prices are adjusted using the producer price index), number of firms in
the market and a time trend. Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are
shown in the column to right to the parameter estimates, and ∗∗ ( ∗) denotes a 99% ( 90%) level
of confidence. The first stage results are available from the author upon request.
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Table 4: Estimation results for the pricing relations
Estimates of multi-vintage Estimates of single-vintage
firm pricing relation firm pricing relation
Variable Estimate Std. err. Estimate Std. err.
lnXi,256K -0.341** 0.123 -0.184** 0.078
lnX−i,256K 0.047** 0.009 0.045** 0.008
lnXi,64K -0.196* 0.116 -0.189** 0.077
lnX−i,64K -0.187** 0.011 -0.131** 0.008
ln qi,256K 1.364** 0.316 1.708** 0.359
lnmat 0.101** 0.025 0.113** 0.027
ln lab 0.045** 0.027 0.453** 0.028
ln e -0.144** 0.040 -0.142** 0.040
Dyn Effect 0.089* 0.056 0.129** 0.051
Firm Dummies YES** YES**
Obs.=611, adj. R2=0.575 Obs.=611, adj. R2=0.561
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the pricing equation (6). Columns (2) and (3)
represent the estimation results for the multi-vintage firm specification and columns (4) and (5)
represent the single-vintage firm specification. The table shows the estimation results for the 256K
vintage, which is our benchmark case. The dependent variable is industry price (deflated by the
consumer price index). Explanatory variables are the firm-specific past cumulated output for the
64K and 256K generation, cumulated past output of all other firms for the 64K and 256K genera-
tion, firm-specific contemporaneous output for the 256K generation, prices of material, wage and
energy (factor prices are adjusted using the producer price index), the mark-up, and firm-specific
periods left, and firm-specific dummy variables. We use panel data techniques and instrument con-
temporaneous firm-specific output for the 256K generation, firm-specific past cumulated output for
the 256K generation and cumulated past output of all other firms for the 256K generation using
its lagged values. We also use market structure characteristics, such as the number of firms and
the average market shares for the 256K generation and GDP as a demand shifter. The pricing re-
lations are estimated using two stage least squares. Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust
standard errors are shown in the column on the right to the parameter estimates. ∗∗ (∗) denotes a
99% (90%) level of confidence. The first stage results are available from the author upon request.
The estimates for learning from others are adjusted by the average number of firms in the market,
as we assume that the progrsss of a technology occurs at the industry- or inter-firm level. All
learning eﬀects are represented as learning elasticities.
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